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MODEL SELECTION IN THE BAYESIAN MIXED LOGIT:
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Abstract
The Bayesian Mixed Logit model is estimated in both preference spaceand willingness-
to-pay spaceincorporating a number of distributions for the random parameters, models
that contain constant and random parameters, and misreporting. We calculate the mar-
ginal likelihood for the Mixed Logit, which is required for Bayesian model comparison and
testing, but which has so far received little consideration within the Mixed Logit literature.
We use this model to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) to consume bread which has been
produced with reduced levels of various pesticides so as to protect biodiversity. We nd
some support for estimation in preference space, and our results indicate strong support
for the Mixed Logit compared to the xed parameter Logit. Furthermore, although the
Logit model identies misreporting of preferences, misreporting disappears once hetero-
geneity is incorporated into the model. As a result we conclude that with this data set we
nd support for preference heterogeneity as opposed to misreporting.
Key Words: Mixed Logit, Willingness-to-Pay, Model Comparison
JEL: C11, C25, C52, L92, Q51
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1.Introduction
There has been a rapid adoption and implementation of the Mixed Logit (ML) model
in discrete choice analysis (e.g., Revelt and Train, 1998, Train, 1998, McFadden and Train,
2000, Layton and Levine, 2003, 2005, Train, 2003, Scarpa and Alberini, 2005, and Smith,
2005). The attraction of the ML model stems from the exibility it provides in terms of
approximating any random utility choice problem (Train and Sonnier, 2005). In this paper
we examine several important generalisations of the ML model using Bayesian methods.
The attractiveness of employing Bayesian methods to estimate the ML model has been
noted by Huber and Train (2001) and Hensher and Greene (2003). First, the likelihood
function of the ML may be multi-modal and inference based on analysis at one mode,
and curvature of the likelihood at that mode may be misleading. Second, a Bayesian
approach can incorporate prior knowledge about the experimental design in a way that
cannot be achieved by using Classical methods (Ferrini and Scarpa, 2007). Ruud (1996)
and Train and Weeks (2005) note that sometimes the ML may be near non-identied or
weakly identied in certain regions of the parameter space. The existence of such regions
may stall a Classical optimisation algorithm and impair inference that is solely based on
the curvature of the likelihood at a given point. However, the fact that such regions exist,
need not imply that the data is non-informative about the parameters. A prior that does
not dominate the data, can never the less prove important since it can prohibit, or limit
the propensity of, parameters wanderinginto near non-identied regions. By contrast,
Classical estimation of the ML can prove di¢ cult and infeasible where the likelihood is
not well behaved in this respect. Third, the calculation of the marginal likelihood enables
model comparison and testing in a way that is more general than can be achieved using
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Classical methods. Within the ML literature, much attention has been paid to the relative
performance of non-nested alternatives. Whether models are nested or non-nested has no
implications for the use of the marginal likelihood in Bayesian inference.
In spite of these potential advantages, Bayesian estimation of the ML has not been
extensively exploited. By contrast, Classical estimation of the ML is common (i.e., Hen-
sher and Greene, 2003 and Train, 2003). There are several reasons for this situation.
First, in contrast with classical software, publically available Bayesian software has not
easily allowed the utility coe¢ cients to be conditioned on variables that explain individ-
ualspreferences. This is in spite of the fact that this approach has been developed and
implemented in the work of Rossi et al. (1996) and Allenby and Rossi (1999). Second,
whereas Classical methods have allowed for the mixture of xed and random coe¢ cients,
this has not been facilitated in Bayesian procedures. Moreover, proper model comparison
within a Bayesian framework requires the computation of the marginal likelihood. Al-
though relatively simple in principle, practical implementation is di¢ cult. The research
presented in this paper addresses these, and other, issues.
Specically, our work integrates four key components. First, unlike most previous
Bayesian applications using the ML, we allow parameters (some or all) to be xed (i.e.,
have no unobserved heterogeneity). At rst glance this may seem trivial as, in a sense,
it is just a special case of the ML. However, implementing this procedure requires addi-
tional Metropolis-Hastings (MH) steps so as to estimate the xed parameters. As is well
recognised in the literature (e.g., Louviere, 2006), the division of utility coe¢ cients by
a numeraire coe¢ cient (usually the payment attribute coe¢ cient) is the primary source
of instability for the WTP estimates derived from choice models estimated in preference
space. When the payment coe¢ cients are random (have unobserved heterogeneity), the
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moments of WTP ratio do not exist. Fixing the parameter o¤ers one potential remedy to
this problem, and further justications are discussed in Train (2003, p.311). Therefore,
the payment coe¢ cient in choice models has often been xed in applied Classical studies
and it is worth having an equivalent facility when using a Bayesian approach. We would
argue, however, that this restriction is somewhat adhoc. Its imposition has been justied
on the grounds that it stablises WTP estimates, rather than through sound theoretical
arguments. For this reason, we regard it as important to test this restriction, rather than
impose it a priori. In addition, by having general algorithms which allow any or all of the
parameters to be xed or random, this also allows us to assess the support for the xed
parameter logit relative to the ML providing the marginal likelihoods for the models are
calculable (see below).
Second, as suggested by the Classical contributions of Cameron and James (1987),
Cameron (1988) and Train and Weeks (2005), we estimate the ML in WTP space as
well as the conventional preference space. In essence, WTP space estimation species
di¤erent distributions for the marginal rates of substitution compared to those estimated
in preference space. As already noted, the instability of the WTP estimates is especially
acute where the parameter of the payment attribute is variable and is not bounded above
zero. Train and Sonnier (2005) explore transformations of normals, partly because this
then presents the opportunity to bound the resulting WTPs. However, transformations
such as the exponential (so that the distribution of the utility coe¢ cient is log-normal)
are problematic in theory, not least because the model will depend on how the attribute
variable is scaled, as well as in practice. For this reason, WTP space estimation is attractive
on a practical level, since it avoids this problematic ex post estimation problem.
Third, the estimation of the marginal likelihood is performed using Halton sequences
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and the support for di¤erent specications can, therefore, be measured. In particular, we
compare models with alternative distributions for the utility parameters, including the
case where each or all are constant. This enables a test for the dominance of the ML over
its xed parameter version, a test that has not been previously conducted. In addition, we
assess the support for the (special) case where only the price coe¢ cient is held constant,
since this may greatly decrease the variance of WTP estimates, without being overly
restrictive. The support for models estimated in WTP space is also assessed. To date,
no attempt has been made within the Bayesian literature to test whether this approach
is more compatible with data, relative to the preference space approach. By employing
Halton sequences, the marginal likelihood is simulated and a number of models, both
with and without misreporting, are compared. The numerical accuracy of the marginal
likelihood is measured by employing a stationary bootstrap (described in Li and Maddala,
1997) once the sequence of likelihoods has been generated.
Fourth, we generalise the ML model to allow for the possibility of misreporting as
dened and analysed Balcombe et al. (2007). They examined issues of misreporting
in discrete choice models (i.e., Conditional Logit) in a way that is similar to the mis-
classicationapproach outlined in Hausman et al. (1998) and Caudhill and Mixon (2005).
Implicitly, the ML model assumes that all respondents reply in accordance with how they
would behave in a revealed preference study. However, it is possible that in many stated
preference surveys, respondents express preferences that are not in accordance with their
realpreferences. Potential reasons include be strategic responses, yeh sayingor cognitive
limitations on behalf of respondents (i.e. either they do not understand, or have not got the
time to understand the choices) and associated e¤ects induced by the way that questions
are framed. The misreporting approach attributes each respondent with a trueutility
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function, but posits that respondents may (with some probability) answer in a way that is
completely independent of these preferences. Whereas a Gumbel error in a utility function
allows for divergent choices between individuals with similar utility functions, it does not
actually allow for the possibility that agents have very strong preferences, yet ignore these
preferences when responding to a stated preference survey. The description misreporting
accurately portrays the underlying idea that the utility function exists and the reporting is
not always in accordance with these utilities. Balcombe et al. (2007) found strong evidence
of misreporting using a xed parameter model. However, is the nding of misreporting in
a Logit, simply a consequence of ignoring heterogeneity in preferences? Or, alternatively,
how much preference heterogeneity identied by a ML model is attributable to preferences
and how much might be a function of misreporting?
Taking these various components together, the analysis in this paper extends the
Bayesian ML models employed in the literature to date. , We also note that as in Rossi
et al. (1996), the framework and models we develop in this paper enable the parameters
within an agentsutility function to be dependent on the agentscharacteristics. However,
in the empirical example we present, we do not condition the parameters of individuals
characteristics. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the framework is general in this
regard.
To demonstrate the utility of the methods developed in this paper we employ a new
data set derived from a Choice Experiment (CE) undertaken to examine and estimate
consumer WTP to consume food (i.e., bread) produced using wheat grown using reduced
levels of pesticides (Chalak et al, 2006). The motivation for this CE stems from the
impact on the landscape and its associated biodiversity from the use of pesticides to
allow intensication of agriculture. For example, bird populations have been a¤ected by
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pesticide use, especially insecticides and herbicides, because they kill invertebrate prey
and insect host plants and as a result impact the quantity and quality of feed available.
This research and the results we present add to a small number of stated preference studies
undertaken with respect to pesticide use (e.g., Foster and Mourato, 2000, 2002, Hamilton
et al., 2005, Canavari et al, 2005, Florax et al., 2005, and Balcombe et al., 2007).
2. The Model
2.1. Notation and Model Specication
xj;s;n denotes the k1 vector of attributes presented to the jth individual (j = 1; ::::; J)
in the sth option (s = 1; :::; S) of the nth choice set (n = 1; ::::; N) : Uj;s;n is the utility
that the j th individual derives from xj;s;n and in accordance with notational conventions
in the literature yj;s;n denotes an indicator variable that is 1 if the j th individual indicates
that they would choose the sth option within the nth choice set, and 0 if they would
not. It is stressed that yj;s;n denotes only whether an individual indicates that they would
choose a particular option, not that they necessarily prefer that option. Whereas in the
standard framework choices are dependent only on the relative utility derived from choice
attributes, with potential misreporting there is the chance that utilities and choices will
diverge.
The notation f (x) and f(xj:) are used to denote density and conditional density func-
tions that take an unspecied form, and F (x) and F (xj:) the associated cumulative
distributions. The notation fN (xj;
) denotes that a random vector x has a normal
distribution with mean  and variance 
; and fIW (xjT0; v0) denotes that x has an inverse
Wishart distribution with the parameters T0; and v0 and fU (a; b) will denote the uniform
distribution over the interval (a,b).
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The utility that the j th individual receives from the sth choice in the nth choice set
is assumed to be linear, except that the parameters may be transformed. Consequently,
the utility function is of the form
Uj;s;n = x
0
j;s;ng(j) + es;j;n (1)
where j is a (k  1 ) vector describing the preferences of the jth individual and g (:) is
some transformation of the parameters, from and to the space of k vectors.
Without loss of generality, we will assume that the parameters j are ordered so that







Both sets can be conditioned on variables describing the characteristics of the jth indi-
vidual. Preferences may therefore be determined by a vector zj ; a (h 1) column vector
of variables describing the characteristics of the j th individual (h being 1 and z0j being
1, for all j, if there are no characteristics). More specically, dening Zj = Ik 
 zj the






j b + uj
and uj is a independently and identitically normally distributed vector with variance
covariance matrix 
. The errors fujg are assumed to be uncorrelated across individuals.
The function g(:) may take any of the transformation of the normal distribution dis-
cussed in Train and Sonnier (2005). In considering estimation in WTP space, we also use
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are marginal rates of substitution with
the numeraire element of attribute vector (the rst element in the case above). If such a
transformation is used then we say that estimation is taking place in WTP space. Other-
wise, estimation is being performed in preference space. The error es;j;n is extreme value
(Gumbel) distributed, is independent of x0s;j;n and is also uncorrelated across individuals
or across choices.
The set of all stated choices by respondents is Y = fyj;s;ngj;s;n. The set of characteris-
tics describing all respondents is Z = fzjgj . The set of options given to the j th individual
is Xj = fxj;s;ngs;n and the set of all option sets given to all respondents is X = fXjgj :
The data D is, therefore, the collection D = fY;Z;Xg :
Faced with a set of choices, the j th individual will prefer xsk;n providing that Uj;sk;n >
Uj;sq ;n for all k not equal to q. The model in this paper extends existing specications so
that each respondent has a probability () of misreporting, along with a probability (s)
that misreporting (should it occur) will be in favour of option s (where
P
s = 1).The
parameters related to misreporting (described in more detail below) will be denoted as
 = (; 1; :::::S 1) :Therefore, the collection of all parameters describing the model
will be denoted as  = (;
;) : In what follows, the set fbjgj will be denoted as B







db1:::::dbn is expressed as
R
B dB. This integral is a denite integral, and,
therefore, it is implicitly assumed that this integral is over a specied set for B:
2.2. Misreporting.
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Under the assumptions above, conditionally on the parameters j ; the probability of
the j th respondent preferring the sth option is logistic:
Pr
 









The misreporting approach developed in Balcombe et al. (2007) attributes a probability
to a respondent correctly responding to a given choice as : Extending this approach to
the case where respondents are presented with multiple choice sets, denote the indicator
variable vj;n = 1 if individual j correctly reports their preferred choice within the nth choice
set and zero otherwise. Dening the probability of correct reporting as Pr (vj;n = 1) = ;







yj;s;n = 1jvj;n = 1

 + Pr (yj;s;n = 1jvj;n = 0) (1  ) : (6)
By assigning a probability to the event that the j th individual will mis-report in favour of




The probability that ys;j;n = 1 becomes
pj;s;n =  _pj;s;n + (1  )s: (7)
This model could be extended by allowing for mis-reporting probabilities to vary over
choice sets. However, this rapidly leads to over-parameterised models where individuals
are given a high number of choice sets.
2.3. Priors
Bayesian estimation requires priors for the parameters  and 






=   fN (j;A0) (8)
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where A0 is a diagonal matrix . If there are xed and random elements, then the associated
means for these parameters will be denoted as c and b respectively, with corresponding
means c and b. Likewise, A0 contains the diagonal blocks A0;b and A0;c: The prior for
the covariance matrix of the random parameters is:

  fIW (
jT0; v0) (9)
The hyper parameters;A0; T0; v0 are set a priori. The misreporting parameters are
assumed to have a uniform prior, subject to inequality constraints:
  fU (0; 1) (10)













is equal 1 if the constraint is obeyed and zero otherwise. The
integrating constant of this distribution is 1= (S   1)!: Together the set of the priors above
is denoted as P () ; and the priors on  only, as P () :
2.4. Full data Likelihood, the Likelihood and Marginal Likelihood
The full-data (or complete) likelihood function is the likelihood expressed in terms of
the parameters and latent data (in this caseB). So in the case of the ML with misreporting,






























In the absence of latent data we could simply write Lf (fg;;D) = L (;D) : L (;D) is
the likelihood of the model. It is this quantity that is maximised in classical estimation, and
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usually calculated by simulation when there are latent variables. The marginal likelihood,




L (;D) P () d: (13)
The marginal likelihood can be used to calculate a Bayes factor. In e¤ect, a larger
marginal likelihood indicates greater support for a particular model (Koop, 2003).
2.5. The Form of Conditional Posterior Distributions
Since bj are normally distributed around b and 
 , the conditional posteriors for
b and 
 (given B) are the same as for the case of the normal linear regression with
independent Normal and Wishart priors. The two partitioned sets of parameters have
independent priors, and are assumed to be independent. Therefore, for the parameters
with unknown sources of variation the conditional posterior is:
f (bjB;


















The covariance of matrix 
 has the conditional posterior distribution
f (





bj   Z 0jb
  
bj   Z 0jb
0
; v0 + J
1A : (16)
The posterior distribution for each bj cannot be given an analytical expression, but they
observe the proportionality:




















f (bj j;;D) (18)














cj jZ 0jc; A0;c

: (19)
With regard to the misreporting parameters ; the priors are at, therefore:









j;s;n P () (20)
3. Model Estimation
Using the posteriors in Section 2.5, fairly straightforward algorithms can be employed
to map the posteriors of b, and 
; conditionally on values of c and . In summary,
equations [14] through [16] can be used for the Gibbs stepsand [17] provides the basis for
a M-H step for the latent data. However, should some of the parameters be xed or contain
misreporting probabilities, then additional M-H steps are required to map the posterior
distributions of c and , based on the proportionalities in [19] and [20] respectively.
Alternatively, should all parameters be xed, then a M-H algorithm using only [19] and
[20] can be employed to estimate the model.
When estimating the models without mis-reporting or xed parameters, our initial
estimation procedures and proposal densities were of a similar form to that described
in Train and Sonnier (2005). The performance of these unmodied algorithms were in-
vestigated using both Monte-Carlo and real data (not the subject of this paper). The
estimation of models without random parameters converged quite quickly. However, with
random parameters, the alogrithms were slower. Our procedures and those made avail-
able by Kenneth Train had approximately the same rates of convergence. Furthermore,
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ensuring convergence with real data was often more problematic, with estimation some-
times doubling, relative to when Monte-Carlo data was used. The rates of convergence




that were used. Models that included
misreporting were slower to compute (perhaps an increase of up to 50%), because of the
extra steps required to compute the model, as well as the increased dependence that was
evident in the values generated by the sampler.
In an e¤ort to improve the speed of convergence of our MCMC algorithms, we em-
ployed a number methods discussed in the Bayesian literature (e.g., Gilks and Roberts,
1996). In particular, we found that the performance of the independence sampler was gen-
erally superior to the random walk algorithm. At equivalent acceptance rates, the typical
dependence of the sampler was reduced. But, as noted by Roberts (1996), independence
samplers are unlikely to be an optimal stand alone algorithm. So we used a mixture
of the proposal densities, such that at each iteration, a proportion of bj were randomly
assigned a random walk proposal density, and others were assigned the independence pro-
posal density. Also for our larger models we employed a method called "heating the
chain" periodically, which is then followed by burn inphases, before returning to record-
ing the output from the sampler (Chen et al, 2000). In problem cases, this strategy gave
at least a four fold increase in the e¢ ciency of the algorithms. Details of all estimation
and procedures are available from the authors on request.
Convergence of the sampler is monitored in several ways. First, visual plots of the
sampled values are produced as the sampler runs for the sequences of ;
 and . Second,
the degree of dependence of the sampled values is examined by estimating the autocorre-
lation coe¢ cients of the sequential values of the sampler. The skip(only every skipth
iteration is recorded) was then set so as to allow a lesser degree of dependence should
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autocorrelation be too high (i.e. if coe¢ cients have a rst order correlation of more than
0.975 it is unlikely that an accurate value for the coe¢ cients will be obtained when tak-
ing the mean or median, even with a sample of 10,000). Third, a modied t-test for the
hypothesis of no-di¤erencebetween the rst and second half of the sampled values (with
a subset eliminated from the middle) was conducted on the sequence of  parameters.
This used an estimate of the long-run covariance matrix (the spectral density matrix of
the sequence at frequency 0) provided by the spectral kernel methods outlined in An-
drews (1991). Our procedures enable the user to continue the run of the MCMC after a
preliminary examination of the results should the sampler not have passed the tests for
convergence.
3.1. Choice of Priors
In previous work Train (2003) and Train and Sonnier (2005) use non-informative (im-
proper) priors for the mean and variance of ; and informative priors for the inverse
Wishart distribution on 
;setting these equal to v0 = k and T0 = k:Ik. Our Monte-Carlo
work indicated that setting T0 = k:Ik inated estimates of the covariance matrices 
 gen-
erated by the sampler and inated values of  also. This tendency depended on the values
of 
 used to generate the data, the number of attributes, the sample size and the num-
ber of choice sets given to each respondent. However, when all parameters are random,




2 being the number of free elements
in the covariance matrix, improved model performance, in that it did not over inate the
estimates of the covariance matrices 
 and were dominated by the data in cases where the
elements of 
 were larger.
Proper priors are used for  because the marginal likelihood values cannot be com-
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puted without them. Fully non-informative priors can be obtained by setting the diagonal
elements of A0 to very large values. However, the priors employed here are set more in-
formatively, with A0 = 10Ik and  = 0. In a standard linear regression framework these
priors would, in most cases, be considered highly informative. However, in the context of
the Logit we would argue that they are only weakly informative. Given a choice set (X),
we can explore what priors on  and 
 imply about priors on pj;s;n. In terms of a prior
for the probability of choosing a particular option, these priors are very similar. However,
this prior information can sometimes have a substantive impact in restricting the absolute
values of ; and in doing so also substantially improve the performance of the sampler.
This is particularly useful in specications that attempt to truncate the distributions of
bj (such as the truncated normal in Train and Sonnier, 2005) since, the whole of the dis-
tribution can become massed at a point of truncation, and  can become non-identied.
In such circumstances, an informative prior can prevent this parameter wandering into
non-identied regions indenitely.
3.2. Calculating the Marginal Likelihood
One of the main aims of this paper is to evaluate alternative specications. This
requires the calculation of the marginal likelihood in [13]. The ratio of the marginal
likelihoods gives the posterior odds for the two models(measuring the relative support for
these models) given that the prior odds are even.
While theoretically straightforward, marginal likelihood calculations can be practically
problematic in cases where the parameter space has many dimensions. Raftery (1996)
provides a good discussion of methods available to calculate the marginal likelihood. For
example, the method of Gelfand and Dey (1994) (GD), estimates the marginal likelihood
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using






P (i) L (i;D;M)
#
(21)
or alternatively, if there are latent data,






P (Biji)P (i) Lf (Bi;i;D;M)
#
(22)
where i and Bs;i are draws from their posterior distributions. The tuning functions
 (i) or  (i;Bi) are densities with tails that are su¢ ciently thin so that the fractions
within the expressions [21] or [22] are bounded from above. Alternatively, the tuning
functions can be set equal to the priors, in which case the expressions [21] and [22] collapse
to harmonic means. While this approach simplies matters, harmonic means are known to
be unstable and generally give poor estimates of the marginal likelihood (Raftery, 1996).
The second estimate [22] is the easier to calculate, for a given choice of  (i;Bi).
It does not require recording draws of B, which would be memory intensive; providing
 (i;Bi) and P (Biji) are recorded when running the sampler. However, Raftery (1996)
suggests that the GD method tends to give poor estimates in high dimensional problems.
As B contains up to J  k elements, our approach is to use [21] in preference to [22] in
order mitigate the negative impacts of this dimensionality.
In performing the calculation of [21], as in Classical estimation, L (;D;M) can be
simulated by making successive draws ofBt (t=1,......T) from f (Bj;
;Z) and calculating
the likelihood as outlined in Chapter 10, of Train (2003). In our work we used a truncated
normal tuning function (see Koop 2003 pp.104-106, for details). Computational di¢ culties
arise using this method, since L (i;D;M) requires computation by simulation for each
value. Halton sequences, as described in Train (2003), greatly improve the e¢ ciency of
the simulated likelihood and these can be employed in simulating the likelihood at each of
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the posterior points facilitating the calculation of the marginal. Therefore, the results in
this paper employ Halton sequences for this purpose. Monte-Carlo simulation suggested
that using 500 replications in conjunction with Halton sequences yielded accurate values.
In conducting the work in the paper, the GD likelihood calculations in [21] appeared to
be able to work well in discriminating between di¤erent specications generated using
Monte-Carlo methods.
Finally, it is evident from equation [21] that estimation of the marginal likelihood is
an average of the quantity f (i)=
 (i)
P (i)L(i;D;M)
: As such, even in large samples, the
numerical error in the estimate of the marginal likelihood needs to be considered when
conducting model comparisons. An estimate of the numerical error can be obtained, but,
the dependence in f (i) induced by the dependence of the sequence i needs to be
accounted for in producing an estimate of this standard error. In this paper we employ
a stationary bootstrap described in Li and Maddala (1997). A stationary bootstrap is a
random length block bootstrap (e.g. Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) that accounts for the
potential dependence in the sequence of likelihoods.
4. Empirical Section
4.1. Data.
The empirical work in this paper employs a new data set derived from a CE used to
estimate the WTP for pesticide reductions in wheat used to produce bread. The use of
bread as the product of interest is in keeping with Foster and Mourato (2000, 2002). For
the application presented here, no explanatory variables are used for the parameters in
the Utility function. In e¤ect, therefore, zj = 1 for all individuals.
Briey, all CE respondents were presented with three choice cards, each consisting of
19
three agricultural production practices:
 Policy A: current farming practices and national levels of pesticide applications;
 Policy B: a green policy employing less pesticides than under the status quo; and,
 Policy C: a nationwide ban on pesticide use.
The payment level was selected to be typical of consumer prices in the UK. The price
of the standardloaf was identied following an overview of price ranges as advertised in
store and on the websites of the main UK grocers (around 50 pence for status quo loaf
of bread). The alternatives and choice sets were constructed using a fractional factorial
design that yielded 24 choice sets that were grouped in blocks of three choice cards. The
survey instrument was piloted before being distributed by post to 3,000 households. The
sample was stratied according to age, income and county of residence. The total number
of analysable questionnaires was 420 and comparing the sample to national average gures
indicates that our sample is reasonably representative of the UK population.
The attributes used in the study were percentage reductions insecticides, herbicides
and fungicides. This is di¤erent to existing studies which only consider pesticide in gnereal.
The reason for taking this approach was so that reductions for each of the types of pesticide
could be considered so as to capture di¤erent a¤ects on the environment. This allows to
estimate the WTP for a reduction in a specic type of pesticide, something which has not
been done before in the literature.
There were also three policies identied on each choice card. A and C are constant
in each of their attribute levels (zero percentage reductions in all three attributes for
A and 100% reduction in all three attributes for C). Policy B, however, varied across
the choice sets. For this reason there are two other potential attributes that can be
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added to the model, which treats Greennessand Banningas a di¤erent attributes, with
intrinsic qualities that are not embodied in the values of the attribute levels associated
with policy B. An alternative (i.e., attribute) specic constant cannot be included for
Policy A as it would be perfectly collinear with the other attributes in the system. This
approach is commonly employed in the environmental as well as marketing orientated
choice modelling literatures before (e.g., Bjorner, et al, 2004). Since within each choice
set, there were three policies, not only can potential misreporting be identied, but the
direction of misreporting, should it exist, can be identied in favour of policies, A, B, C.
A complete description of the survey instrument and data is presented in Chalak et al
(2006).
4.2. Results
Our procedures allow us to estimate models with ve alternative distributions for
the parameters in preference and/or WTP space: normal; log-normal; truncated normal
(with values below zero massed at zero); and the SB distributions (see Train and Sonnier,
2005, for more details). As discussed this paper extends these options to include xed
specications on some or all of the coe¢ cients. This enables us to test for the dominance
of the ML over the xed parameter Logit model. In addition, we estimate the models in
WTP space as well including misreporting and all models estimated are compared using
marginal likelihoods. We did not explore using truncated distributions or SB distributions
as we do not, a priori, wish to restrict the WTP for the attributes in the choice sets to
be positive, whereas distributions such as the log-normal and truncated normal involve
positivity constraints. The SB distribution can usefully impose bounds on the parameters,
but this requires a reasonable idea as to where the bounds of this distribution lie, and we
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have no secure prior knowledge in this regard. Consequently, alternative distributions are
explored for the payment coe¢ cient only.
Our model results are reported in Table 1. Using the methods discussed in section
3, all models converged tolerably. Each model is denoted as B and there are 12 di¤erent
versions presented. Models B1 and B1* are the xed parameter Logit, and the remaining
models are various ML specications. Marginal likelihood values were calculated at all
points in the sample, using 500 Halton sequences at each point, and these are used to
derive the relative rank of the models estimated.
{Approximate Position of Table 1}
As we can see from Table 1 all the ML specications outperform the xed parameter
Logit on the basis of the marginal likelihood estimates. Moreover, the specication of
a xed coe¢ cient on the intercept is also not supported. The marginal likelihood for
models B1 and B1* in Table 1 are much smaller than for any other specication, and the
next worst performing model (of those that include all the attributes) are models B5 and
B5*. The xed parameter specication B1* identies signicant misreporting on behalf
of respondents, with 39% ( = 0:61) of respondents being estimated to misreport. The
posterior distribution for this parameter is presented Figure 1.
{Approximate Position of Figure 1}
As can be seen from Figure 1, the distribution is unimodal, with its mode being away
from its boundaries. The estimated direction of misreporting (mean of posterior, not
presented in tables) is 22%, 38% and 40% in favour of options 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Thus, this model suggests that a large proportion of the population has a tendency to
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misreport in favour of the Green (B) policy or the Total Ban (C) policy which are always
associated with options 2 and 3.
However, support for misreporting is signicantly reduced for all the ML specications.
There is support when we consider models B2 and B2*, where the marginal likelihood for
the misreporting model B2* is larger than its standard version B2. But, the proportion
of respondents misreporting is extremely small proportion at 1.27%. The direction of
misreporting for B2* (mean of posterior, not presented in tables) is 25% 27% and 48% in
favour options 1, 2 and 3, respectively, again suggesting that those people who misreport,
do so in favour of a total ban. However, the standard error on the marginal likelihoods
are large, and we cannot be condent that B2* is truely preferred using this model.
Likewise, for model B5 and B5*, the marginal likelihood could not be estimated accurately
enough to discriminate between the standard and misreporting counterpart, though the
point estimate of the marginal likelihood supports the specication misreporting. Further
MCMC trials might allow us to discriminate between the models B2 and B2*, and B5
and B5*. However, since these models are dominated by B3, B3*, B4 and B4*, we do not
conduct any further analysis on these models.
Focusing on B3, B3*, B4 and B4*, our superior performing models, we nd that the
data do not support a model where all parameters have normal distributions. These
models all have log-normal distributions for the price coe¢ cient. The models B3 and B3*
are estimated in preference space, and the models B4 and B4* are estimated in WTP
space. As can be observed from Table 1, the models estimated in WTP space have higher
marginal likelihoods than their counterpart specications estimated in preference space.
Both sets of models with log-normal coe¢ cients fail to support misreporting on the basis
of their marginal likelihood estimates.
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We also considered dropping the attribute specic constants for policies B and C. In
this case, models B6 and B6*are not supported on the basis of the marginal likelihoods.
Interestingly, B6* estimates that around 32% of respondents misreport their preferences.
The direction of misreporting (mean of posterior, not presented in tables) is estimated to
be predominantly in the direction of the Green policy B, (around 98%) with around 1%
of people misreporting in favour of each other option. This is consistent with the ndings
in Table 2 that suggest that the Green Policy seems to be the attribute with the highest
WTP. Summarising the model selection results:
i) ML models are preferred over the xed parameter Logit model;
ii) Models that restricted the heterogeneity in the price were inconsistent with the
data;
iii) Misreporting potentially appears to be partly a function of inappropriate restric-
tions (i.e., mis-specication) on heterogeneity as misreporting was supported by the all
normalmodel;
iv) The models with log-normal coe¢ cients on the price attribute were preferred to
other specications, and of these the model estimate in WTP space was preferred.
Next we examine the WTP estimates. Table 2 presents the WTP estimates for the
two top models (B3 and B4), as selected using the marginal likelihoods.
{Approximate Position of Table 2}
As already noted, these are the two models with log-normal distributions for the price
coe¢ cients, and normal distributions for all other parameters. The price coe¢ cient in
the second column of Table 2 is not a WTP estimate. It is the coe¢ cient of the price in
the utility function. This parameter only plays the role of a scaleparameter. Examining
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the median values of the WTP distributions for model B4, the value 23.5 pence in the
second column of the row headed by Insecticide Reduction, means that consumers are
prepared to pay, on average, an additional 23.5 pence on a 50 pence loaf of bread (an
approximate 50% increase) for a 100% reduction in insecticides (and half this amount for
a 50% reduction etc.). Herbicide and fungicides are estimated to have positive but smaller
median WTPs at 9 and 15 pence respectively. Interestingly, policies B and C are estimated
to have even higher WTP values than direct reductions in pesticides. The attribute with
the highest WTP is that of the Green Policy. Consumers are estimated to be prepared
to pay an additional 56.7 pence on a basic 50 pence loaf of bread if it was produced as
part of a wider policy that involved partial reductions in pesticide usage. On the other
hand, consumers are less enthusiastic on the idea of having a total ban on pesticide usage,
being estimated to be WTP only half that of the Green Policy(at around 27 pence).
The stronger support for a Green Policy over a Ban as revealed by the relative WTP
estimates is interesting. We might speculate that this occurs because there is maybe a
reluctance to support a ban on pesticides because this will impact consumer choice. This
argument has been advanced previously in the literature by Hamilton et al (2003) and
Canavari et al (2005).
Notably, for model B4 estimated in WTP space, the mean and median values are almost
identical. Unsurprising, in that each of the WTP parameters are assumed to be normally
distributed. However, turning to model B3 and the preference space results in the last
two columns of Table 2, it is evident that the median values (in the last column) are very
similar to the median and mean results produced by the WTP space model. However, the
mean results are very di¤erent even though the distribution for the price coe¢ cient was
constrained to be log-normal. The mean WTPs are higher across the board. This reects
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the relatively large leverage of small values of the denominator (the price coe¢ cient) in
the WTP calculation that is the ratio of two coe¢ cients. In our view, the WTP values
derived from the WTP space estimation are quite high, and the mean WTP estimates
produced by the preference space model are very high. Moreover, the ordering of the
attributes according to their WTP values changes whether the mean or median is used in
the preference space model. This is most likely due to the di¤erent correlations for each
of the attribute coe¢ cients with the price coe¢ cient.
How do these WTP estimates compare to those previously reported in the literature?
The most obvious comparison is with those for the UK. With Foster and Mourato (2000),
for example, they estimated that UK consumers are WTP £ 1.15 (or 191 percent extra)
for a green loaf of bread in order to reduce to zero cases of ill health per year and the
number of declining farmland bird species jointly. Balcombe et al. (2007) looked at food
choice for a whole basket of goods found that older females who classied themselves as
either food safety aware or environmentally sensitive were WTP 150 percent more for the
non-pesticide food. In contrast young males who described themselves as price sensitive
yielded a WTP of almost zero. Overall, the sample average was 90 percent. So our
WTP estimates are plausible in as much as they fall within the bounds of those previously
reported.
Finally, in Table 3 we examine the correlation coe¢ cients for the top performing model
B4.
{Approximate Position of Table 3}
From Table 3 we can see that the price coe¢ cient is negatively correlated to the
other WTP coe¢ cients. As already noted, the price coe¢ cient plays the role of a scale
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parameter. However, its value may conate a number of e¤ects including the individuals
income level and marginal utility of income. This parameter does have meaning, at least
from a statistical perspective. If two individuals have the same WTP for all attributes,
then the person with the higher scale parameter is predicted to make a choice with more
certainty than an individual with a smaller scale coe¢ cient (since the relative variance of
the Gumbel error is smaller). Train and Weeks (2005) discuss the interpretation of the
scale parameter in detail. The negative correlations between the scale coe¢ cients and the
other coe¢ cients suggest that those with a lower WTP for the model attributes are no
less predictable than those with higher WTPs. The correlations between the WTP values
are mainly positive with the exception of herbicide and insecticide. This is consistent with
a priori expectations that an individual who is prepared to pay a larger than average
amount for a reduction in one type of pesticide would also be WTP a larger than average
amount for a reduction in another, or support a green or total ban policy. However, in
general these are small. The bancoe¢ cient is the most positively correlated coe¢ cient
with the coe¢ cients of the herbicide, fungicide and green policy attributes. Therefore,
those supporting a total ban were generally individuals that were also prepared to pay
higher amounts for reductions in the fungicidal and herbicidal reductions.
5. Summary and discussion
This paper has generalised existing approaches to the estimation of the ML and em-
ployed an original data set designed to obtain WTP estimates for reduced pesticides in
bread production. Several questions were addressed. First, whether there was evidence
that respondents misreported their preferences. Second, whether the ML logit was sup-
ported by over the xed parameter Conditional Logit. Third, whether models parame-
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terised in WTP space model were preferred to those in preference space and, nally, we
also tested a range of model specications using the transformations outlined in Train and
Sonnier (2005). In order to address these questions, the marginal likelihood was simulated
by employing Halton sequences. Simulation of the marginal likelihood proved practical,
generally doubling the required computation time, with tolerable standard errors that
enabled us to usefully distinguish between models.
With regard to misreporting. Previous ndings using the xed parameter Conditional
Logit (i.e., Balcombe et al, 2007) were conrmed. There appeared to be a substantive
proportion of respondents misreporting when using the xed parameter Conditional Logit.
Around 25% of respondents were estimated to be misreporting 35% of the time. However,
when allowing for heterogeneity within the ML framework, it was found that this apparent
misreporting largely disappeared. This nding was generally supported regardless of the
transformations employed for the distributions of the parameters. However, any attempts
to restrict heterogeneity (such as restricting the intercept to be constant) increased the
support for the misreporting result.
It is worth noting that the way in which we deal with misreporting in this paper
can be complemented by the introduction of additional questions as part of the survey
instrument. For example, it has become common place in Contingent Valuation studies
(e.g., Alberini et al, 2003 and Vossler and Poe, 2005) to ask respondents to indicate their
level of response uncertainty. The degree of uncertainty expressed by respondents is then
used to calibrate (i.e., reduce) the initial WTP estimates. There is no reason why we
cannot do the same thing as part of a CE. Indeed, it would be interesting to see if the
degree of misreporting estimated econometrically is similar to the magnitude as measured
by an additional certainty follow up question.
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Another key nding of this study, is that the ML was emphatically supported over
the standard Logit using Bayesian methods. There was also no support for xingthe
payment coe¢ cient. This is an important nding as current practice in the ML literature
is to assume a xed price coe¢ cient. Based on the ndings presented in this paper we
consider it essential that this assumption is always tested in empirical studies.
Our data also supported a model estimated in WTP space over those estimated in
preference space. The point estimates of WTP using this model were quite robust. Also,
the median estimates of the WTP generated by a similar model, estimated in preference
space, were almost the same. The mean and median WTP estimates were practically
the same when using WTP space estimation. However, the mean estimates of a model
estimated in preference space were very di¤erent to both the median estimates produced
by the preference space model, or to the mean and medians estimates from the WTP
space model. This was in spite of the fact that the payment coe¢ cient was specied to
be log-normal in both models. Our conclusion is, therefore, if estimation is performed
using the ML in preference space, WTP estimates should be median rather than mean
estimates.
Finally, as a practical observation, we suggest that practitioners using the Bayesian
ML pay considerable attention to the sequence of values that are generated by the sampler.
Visual observation and formal tests for convergence are both valuable in this respect. In
this data set we found that a very large number of iterations were often needed before the
distributions of the parameters were accurately mapped.
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Table 1: Main Model Results
pr in hb fg gr bn wp mr rk MargL se
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . 12 -1253.88 0.003
B1* 0 0 0 0 0 0 . .612 11 -1251.88 0.231
B2 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . 6 -919.90 0.601
B2* 1 1 1 1 1 1 . .987 5 -917.72 0.516
B3 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 -914.36 0.629
B3* 2 1 1 1 1 1 .987 4 -914.79 0.714
B4 2 1 1 1 1 1 y 1 -905.90 0.191
B4* 2 1 1 1 1 1 y .984 2 -911.75 0.731
B5 0 1 1 1 1 1 . 8 -936.91 0.463
B5* 0 1 1 1 1 1 . .984 7 -935.32 0.942
B6 2 1 1 1 . . y . 10 -1189.42 0.071
B6* 2 1 1 1 . . y .682 9 -1058.4 0.156
Notes: pr= price, in=insecticide reduction, hb=herbicide reduction,
fg=fungicide reduction, gr=green policy (B), bn=ban policy (C)
WP=WTP Space
MR=Misreporting, Rk=ranking (1 best, 12 worst)
MargL=Marginal Likelihood,
se=Bootstrap Standard Error on the Estimated Marginal Likelihood.
For columns 2 to 7 numbers represent the following distributions
0=xed, 1=normal, 2=log-normal
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Table 2: WTP Estimates (£ ) - Models B3 and B4














































































Notes: Lower Q=lower quartile; Upper Q=Upper quartile
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Table 3: Correlations in Transformed Coe¢ cients
in hb fg gr bn
pr -0.166 -0.056 -0.156 -0.300 -0.243
in . -0.117 0.085 0.151 0.063
hb . . 0.175 0.056 0.242
fg . . . 0.167 0.416









Figure 1: Proportion Correctly Reporting Bread Data
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